

Sam Kapon

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Graduate Administrator: Ian Johnson ian.johnson@nyu.edu 212 998-8901

Employment

Princeton University, Department of Economics
Postdoctoral Research Associate, 2022-Present
Visiting Research Scholar, 2021-2022

Education

PhD In Economics, New York University, 2015-2021
Thesis Title: *Essays in Mechanism Design and Experiments*
BA in Economics and Mathematics, Brandeis University, 2008-2012

References

Professor Sylvain Chassang Julis Romo Rabinowitz Building
Princeton, NJ 08544 chassang@princeton.edu
Professor Guillaume Fréchette 19 West Fourth St., 6th Floor
New York, NY 10012-1119 212-992-8683 (office)
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Professor Dilip Abreu 19 West Fourth St., 6th Floor
New York, NY 10012-1119 212-998-3548 (office)
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Teaching and Research Fields

Microeconomic Theory, Experimental Economics

Publications and Accepted Papers

Kapon, Sam, "Dynamic Amnesty Programs," *American Economic Review*, 112.12 (2022): 4041-75.

Chassang, Sylvain and Sam Kapon, "Prior-Free Dynamic Allocation Under Limited Liability," *Theoretical Economics*, 17 (2022): 1109-1143.

Job Market Paper

Persuasion in Evidentiary Mechanisms

A primary method of collecting evidence against a group of misbehaving agents (e.g., a cartel) is to offer *whistleblower* rewards to agents who come forward with evidence. But even before a whistleblower comes forward, the regulator typically possesses her own private evidence, though it may not guarantee conviction in court. This paper studies how revealing this private evidence to

group members can facilitate whistleblowing. The more damning the regulator's evidence, the more incentivized, all else equal, a whistleblower is to come forward. I formalize this environment using information design in games. A principal (sender) informs two agents (receivers), about a state (the *evidence* state) that affects the payoffs to whistleblowing. I first ask, if agents can communicate amongst themselves, can the principal improve over public communication with the group? I answer the question in the affirmative, and provide conditions under which the principal's value is *independent* of whether agents can communicate or not. Second, interpreting the evidence state as the probability of conviction *without* a whistleblower, I characterize optimal outcomes and show that the likelihood of whistleblowing is *increasing* in this probability. I show that the principal can facilitate more whistleblowing in groups with more asymmetrically distributed gains from misbehavior across agents. Finally, I show that there are simple information structures that, though potentially suboptimal, robustly improve over public communication.

Working Papers and Work in Progress

Using Divide-and-Conquer to Improve Tax Collection
(with Sylvain Chassang and Lucia Del Carpio)

Hard and Soft Evidence in Repeated Interaction: An Experiment
(with Guillaume Fréchette)

Working Memory and Cooperation
(with Guillaume Fréchette and Emanuel Vespa)

Transparency in Delegated Decision-Making
(with Paula Onuchic)

Teaching Experience

Fall 2016, NYU	(PhD) Econometrics (1 st Year) Teaching Assistant for Quang Vuong and Richard Crump
Fall 2017, NYU	(UG) Strategic Decision Theory Teaching Assistant for Dilip Abreu
Spring 2020, NYU	(PhD) Microeconomics (1 st Year) Teaching Assistant for David Pearce and Alessandro Lizzeri
Fall 2021, Princeton	(PhD) Experimental Economics Professor for half-semester course

Past Employment

Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Research Analyst, 2012-2015